Israel Will Not Allow a ‘Lebanese October 7’… Is Invasion an Option?

To understand the seriousness of what could happen in southern Lebanon, one must begin with a single fact: Israel will not allow a ‘Lebanese October 7’ on its northern border. Of course, Hezbollah can threaten and declare its readiness for any military development, but unfortunately, this does not mean that Israel will back down from achieving its strategic and existential goal, which is to eliminate any potential threat posed by Hezbollah to the residents of northern settlements. – Jad Yateem

Author: Jad Yateem
What is concerning is that Hezbollah is dealing with the international efforts—especially the American ones—to reach arrangements on the southern border with disregard, just as it disregards the lives, future, and opinions of Lebanese people when the Hezbollah, pushed by Iranian orders, decided to unilaterally open the Lebanese southern front, seizing the sovereign decision of declaring war and announcing peace from the constitutionally elected authorities in Lebanon.

This approach, in addition to disregarding the Lebanese national interests, contributes to putting the military option at the forefront as the only way for Israel to achieve its goal of preventing any possible future ‘Lebanese October 7,’ and this includes the option of a ground invasion. In this context, the following scenarios emerge in this ongoing confrontation:

In this context, the following scenarios emerge in this ongoing confrontation:

1. Controlled Escalation:
   The current pace of Israeli escalation and controlled responses from both sides could continue, whether in geography range or targets. However, the risk of this scenario is that it could slip into an open war with any military mistake that causes large civilian casualties or affects sensitive facilities like hospitals and schools. Strategically, this option has begun to exhaust its list of objectives, primarily the near-total destruction of border villages, particularly Shiite ones. What keeps it going so far is its use by the Israel as a pressure card to achieve arrangements on the Lebanese border.
   
   
2. Strategic Strikes:
   This scenario resembles what Lebanon experienced in the 2006 War. Airstrikes do not spare vital civilian and even government facilities, especially energy and food reserves, along with imposing a comprehensive blockade on Lebanon, including targeting official and smuggling routes with Syria. Additionally, the military target list is expanded to include Hezbollah’s long-range missile depots in distant areas like the mountains of Keserwan (Christian Maronite majority, Mount Lebanon) and Akkar (Sunni majority, North Lebanon). But what will differ from 2006 is the possibility that the Israeli army may seek to carry out major assassinations that would change the rules of the game, alter the political scene, and shift the internal balance of power in Lebanon. Assassinations that could be a “game changer”, and on the highest military and political levels in Hezbollah, not excluding Hezbollah’s SG Hassan Nasrallah, thus achieving the strategic goal: eliminating the possibility of a ‘Lebanese October 7.’ However, it remains unlikely that this option will be fully pursued, especially since Israel does not have the green light to carry out assassinations of this magnitude. Although it is complex to obtain American approval for this, the continuation of the war beyond Donald Trump’s arrival at the White House—if it happens—could give this option significant momentum.

Map of the Lebanese, Syrian, and Northern Israel theater of the 2023 Israel-Hamas war
Source: Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0

3. A Wide Range Invasion:
   This would mean repeating Israel’s chronic scenario of an invasion reaching the Litani River in Lebanon. This option can almost entirely be ruled out. The Israeli army’s commanders know that such an invasion would make their troops easy targets for Hezbollah fighters, who are adept at using the terrain and weapons with high-level training. This is coupled with the Israeli military command’s reluctance to engage in an open war of this kind, especially since it has not yet fully recovered from the unannounced losses of the Gaza invasion. The invasion would turn into a ground defeat, preventing the achievement of Israel’s desired strategic objective. This would not contribute to achieving security for the northern settlers but would rather turn southern Lebanon into a military and civilian attrition front for Israel.
   
   
4. A Limited Invasion:
   This involves an Israeli ground invasion that does not exceed 10 kilometers from the southern Lebanese border. Such invasion, would extend from Ras al-Bayyada in the west to Mount Hermon in the east, covering villages like Shamaa (Hill 390), Jabal Bu Nasr al- Din, Yater, Kafra, Haris, Tibnine, Sultaniyeh, Toul, Aalma (Marjayoun), Litani River, Kawkaba, Al-Khalwat, and Al-Kfayer. What makes this scenario the most likely if diplomatic efforts, led by the United States, fail, is that Hezbollah’s withdrawal from this 10-kilometer stretch away from the border is a demand that aligns with international efforts led by France and the United States, after abandoning the initial demand was a complete withdrawal to the north of the Litani River. Moreover, the systematic and large- scale destruction carried out by the Israeli army on the Lebanese villages within this area, accompanied by significant displacement for civilians that exceeded 100,000 people, opens the enemy army’s appetite for a ground invasion in an area devoid of homes and residents, thereby reducing the likelihood of costly ‘street warfare.’ This allows the enemy army to carry out a ground invasion with a “Zero Dead Strategy”. This capability enables the Israelis to negotiate under the pressure of having their forces on lebanon’s lands, giving them a negotiating advantage, making them insist on not withdrawing before imposing the security arrangements they desire.
   
   Of course, these military escalation scenarios come after the political horizon for a serious implementation of Resolution 1701 has been not possible so far. Thus, it is the responsibility of the Lebanese government to prevent the country from being dragged into such destructive scenarios against Israeli army that can violate all norms and international laws. The Lebanese national interests cannot be overlooked, nor can this government, continue abandoning its sovereign role as the sole power that is responsible for declaring war amidst a glaring absence of any national strategy for foreign policy and the Lebanese authorities’ failure to take the initiative in negotiations to implement Resolution 1701 instead of handing over the country and its fate to a parallel entity that does not hide its security, military, and political ties with Iran and does not consider the national interest unless it intersects with or serves the interests of the Iranian regime in its ongoing negotiations.